قَالَ يَٰنُوحُ إِنَّهُۥ لَيْسَ مِنْ أَهْلِكَ إِنَّهُۥ عَمَلٌ غَيْرُ صَٰلِحٍ فَلَا تَسْـَٔلْنِ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِۦ عِلْمٌ إِنِّىٓ أَعِظُكَ أَن تَكُونَ مِنَ ٱلْجَٰهِلِينَ
qāla yā Nūḥu innahū laysa min ahlik, innahū ʿamalun ghayru ṣāliḥ, fa-lā tasʾalni mā laysa laka bihī ʿilm, innī aʿiẓuka an takūna mina'l-jāhilīn
"He said: 'Noah! He is not of your household; he is a deed that is not righteous. So do not ask of Me what you have no knowledge of. I counsel you not to be among the ignorant.'"
This verse is one of the sentences in the sūra that most needs dwelling on, and it holds three separate questions: the variant reading, the definition of "household", and its link with the principle of burden.
Two readings are transmitted for this sentence, and the reading changes the sense. I give it in a table:
| # | Reading | Parsing | Sense |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | innahū ʿamaluN ghayru ṣāliḥ | ʿamal as the predicate of the subject (a noun in the nominative) | "He is a deed that is not righteous" — the person himself is identified with a deed |
| 2 | innahū ʿamiLA ghayra ṣāliḥ | ʿamila a perfect verb, ghayra its object (in the accusative) | "He did a deed that was not righteous" — the act and the agent are separate |
The first reading is the widespread one (that of the majority). The second is also transmitted in the sources for the variant readings; it is widely attributed to al-Kisāʾī. I give this attribution with a hedge, with the note "this is how it is widely reported", and I claim no certainty.
| The first reading | The second reading | |
|---|---|---|
| The structure of the sentence | A nominal sentence — fixity (thubūt) | A verbal sentence — coming to be (ḥudūth) |
| What is said | The person = the deed | The person ≠ the deed; the person did the deed |
| The ground of the separation | The deed done defines the person | The deed done is the cause of the separation |
And both readings arrive at the same conclusion: the separation is not by lineage but by deed. The difference is in how the separation is expressed.
I do not impose a preference. But I enter a note about the language, and it is my own reading: the first reading is a structure used in Arabic for intensification — naming a person by a verbal noun or by a noun (as in "he is justice itself"). The first reading, that is, can also be read as a more emphatic form of the second. This is an explanation, not a ruling.
The root أ-ه-ل: to belong to a place or a person; to settle. Ahl — those who belong to a house, a work, a place.
And over what the sentence says there is disagreement in the classical sources. I give it in a table:
| Reading | What laysa min ahlik means | Ground |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | "He is not of the household whose deliverance was promised" — that is, outside the scope of the promise | The exception in the fortieth verse (illā man sabaqa ʿalayhi'l-qawl) |
| 2 | "He is not of your household in point of religion" — the lineage is there, the bond is not | That ahl is used in the Qurʾān for a shared faith as well |
| 3 | That he was not his son by lineage | In the classical sources this is a minority view |
The third view is transmitted but is counted weak, and it strains against the wording of the verse: in the forty-second verse Noah called him yā bunayya, and in the forty-fifth said ibnī ("my son"); the verse does not correct either expression.
I pass on the first and second readings without imposing a preference. And what they have in common must be recorded: in both, lineage does not determine the scope.
A note, per the rule: on the basis of this verse various accounts about Noah's family have been produced in the classical sources and in the later literature. These are not in the Qurʾān; they are not passed on in this commentary.
The principle of burden was treated at Fāṭir 35/18, and it was recorded there that the principle is tested at its most demanding point. I rely on that treatment. The table there was this:
| Stage | Expression |
|---|---|
| The principle | lā taziru wāziratun wizra ukhrā |
| Addition 1 | One whose load is heavy may ask for help |
| Addition 2 | Even so, none of it is carried |
| Addition 3 | wa law kāna dhā qurbā — even if he be a near relative |
And in the Fāṭir section this entry was made: "The clause dhā qurbā (a near relative) names the most natural place in the world for a load to be shared. By saying that even there it is not shared, the verse builds the principle at its most durable point."
Hūd 11/46 is the application of that same principle inside an event. And a comparison of the two texts must be recorded:
| Fāṭir 35/18 | Hūd 11/46 | |
|---|---|---|
| Kind | A statement of principle — a general ruling | An event — a single case |
| Degree of nearness | dhā qurbā — an unspecified relative | Father and son — the nearest degree |
| What is asked to be carried | ḥiml — a load | Deliverance — the right to board |
| Who asks | muthqala — the person whose load is heavy | Noah — the side with no load |
| The answer | lā yuḥmalu minhu shayʾ | laysa min ahlik |
And the difference must be recorded: in Fāṭir the one who asks is the person carrying the load; in Hūd the one who asks is speaking on another's behalf.
I record this as my own reading, and its ground is how the two texts are built: Fāṭir builds the principle from the side of what cannot be carried; Hūd shows the same principle from the side of what cannot be interceded for. The principle works, that is, in both directions: no one can carry another's load, and no one can lighten that load for another.
And there is another entry on the same line across this series: in al-Taḥrīm the wives of Noah and of Lot were treated as an example that nearness does not deliver. I rely on that treatment. Hūd 11/46 is the same principle shown by way of a son.
The subject of the prohibition must be recorded: what is forbidden is not asking but asking without knowledge. The sentence does not end at lā tasʾalnī; there is the qualification mā laysa laka bihī ʿilm.
| Verse | The prohibition | Its scope |
|---|---|---|
| 37 | lā tukhāṭibnī fi'lladhīna ẓalamū | About those who do wrong |
| 46 | lā tasʾalni mā laysa laka bihī ʿilm | About what is not known |
The two prohibitions are different, and that difference must be recorded. I record this as my own reading: in the forty-fifth verse Noah is not counted as having broken the prohibition of the thirty-seventh — because he did not know that his son was among "those who do wrong". And the warning of the forty-sixth verse lands exactly here: a lack of knowledge.
And the same principle was treated at al-Kahf 18/68 (wa kayfa taṣbiru ʿalā mā lam tuḥiṭ bihī khubrā) and this entry was made there: "the withholding of judgement where knowledge is lacking." I rely on that treatment and record that Hūd 11/46 stands on the same line.
And the construction of the sentence must be recorded: aʿiẓuka an takūna mina'l-jāhilīn — "I counsel you not to be among the ignorant."
In Arabic this structure reports a warning against an outcome; it does not say that the person already bears that attribute.
I give this as a grammatical note and set a limit per the method (Method): no ruling of fault regarding a prophet is to be drawn from this verse. The wording of the verse is a caution, not a characterisation.