مِن شَرِّ مَا خَلَقَ
Root: ش-ر-ر. One of the basic words the Qurʾān uses for evil, and the backbone word of this sūra, repeated four times.
Sharr, in its most general sense, means what is not wanted, what does harm, what is avoided. Its opposite is khayr. In Arabic these two words form a pair, and the Qurʾān often uses them side by side: "Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it; and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it" (al-Zilzāl 99/7-8).
A point of grammar: sharr and khayr are used in Arabic both as nouns ("evil", "good") and as the comparative pattern (ism al-tafḍīl: "worse", "better"). Normally the afʿal pattern is required for comparison (akbar, aḥsan); these two words, however, convey comparison without changing pattern: "You are worse in position" (Yūsuf 12/77). Their being this firmly settled in the language shows how basic the concepts are.
From the same root come sharār / sharar — spark. In the Qurʾān it is used of the fire of Hell: "It throws up sparks like a castle" (al-Mursalāt 77/32). Some lexicographers make a link of meaning between "sharr" and "spark": that which leaps, spreads, sets alight. This association is interesting but is not certain in point of language; I record it as an association.
The state of the word in the verse: min sharri — sharr stands here in the position of muḍāf (the first term of a construct), that is, it is always the evil of something. The sūra does not say abstractly "I take refuge from evil"; each time it binds the evil to a source: the evil of what He created, the evil of the ghāsiq, the evil of those who blow, the evil of the envier.
This is one of the most important features of the sūra's word order, and it has a theological consequence: evil is not a being that stands on its own. It is not an opposing god, an independent power, a principle of evil existing in its own right. It is always the quality of something, an effect issuing from something. In the world into which the Qurʾān came down the duality of a god of good and a god of evil was a living form of belief; the linguistic structure of the sūra leaves no room for that duality.
Two readings of "mā". In Arabic mā can perform more than one function, and two readings have been made of the mā here:
1. Mā mawṣūla (the relative pronoun): "From the evil of the things He created." The evil is ascribed to created beings. This is the preference of the majority.
2. Mā maṣdariyya (the particle of the verbal noun): "From the evil of His creating." On this reading the evil is bound to the act of creating. This reading is mentioned in the classical sources but is not preferred, because it is theologically problematic and is forced in point of language as well.
There is a debate about scope as well. It is transmitted from some early exegetes that the expression "mā khalaq" means Iblīs and his offspring in particular. This is a reading that narrows the expression, and it has remained a minority one. The wording of the word is general; to narrow it requires evidence.
At first sight this verse seems to say something disturbing: evil is inside what has been created. And the one with whom refuge is taken is the one who created what has been created.
It would not be right to pass this matter over. But to settle it is not within the competence of this text either — it is one of the longest debates in Islamic thought, and it will not be closed by a few paragraphs given here. What I can do is to show what the language of the verse says and does not say.
First: the verse does not say "from the evil He created". The construct is min sharri mā khalaqa: "from the evil of the thing He created". The evil is named not directly as the object of the act of creating but as a state, a work of what has been created. This may look like a fine difference, but in Arabic it has been read as a deliberate choice.
Second: the Qurʾān observes a consistent manner in this matter. Evil is not ascribed to God directly and in an affirmative sentence. A few examples:
- On the lips of the jinn: "We do not know whether evil is intended for those on earth, or whether their Lord intends right guidance for them" (al-Jinn 72/10). Note: for the evil the passive ("is intended") is used, for the guidance the active ("their Lord intends"). Two different voices in the same sentence.
- On the lips of Abraham (Ibrāhīm): "And when I fall ill, it is He who heals me" (al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/80). The illness to the first person, the healing to God.
- "Whatever good comes to you is from God; and whatever evil comes to you is from yourself" (al-Nisāʾ 4/79). When this verse is read together with the one before it (4/78: "all is from God"), it is seen that the matter is taken up on two separate planes: on the plane of creation everything is from Him, on the plane of responsibility evil is from the human being.
Third: the main positions in the tradition of kalām. Without going into detail, in order to show where the debate is knotted:
| Position | Basic claim |
|---|---|
| The general tendency of the Muʿtazila | The servant creates his own act; God does not create what is evil. The principle of justice is taken as the basis |
| The Ashʿarī line | God is the creator of everything, and evil too, in point of creation, is from Him; but the servant acquires it (kasb) and the responsibility is the servant's |
| The Māturīdī line | The creating belongs to God, the choice and the direction of the act to the servant; the servant's particular will is emphasised |
| A widespread approach in the philosophical tradition | Evil is not an independent being but a privation, a lack (ʿadam); it is therefore not a thing that is "created" |
I give this table not in order to settle the debate but in order not to present a single view as though it were the only view. I state no preference.
Fourth — and this is what the sūra really says: the verse does not offer a theodicy (a defence in the face of evil). It does not explain why evil exists. It accepts that evil exists and says what is to be done in the face of it: take refuge.
This is an attitude not very widespread among religious texts in general. The sūra does not deny evil, does not make it small, does not pass it off by saying "there is really a good in it", does not say "your point of view is wrong". Evil is real, it has names, it is counted one by one. And a single thing is proposed: to go to the owner of the source.
The second verse covers all evils. There is no evil that falls outside the expression "the evil of the things He created". Why, then, are verses 3, 4 and 5 needed?
In rhetoric this manner is called "the mention of the particular after the general": after a general statement has been made, particular instances falling within that statement are named separately. This is not repetition; it is the drawing of attention. What is named separately has an importance, a danger, or a likelihood of being forgotten.
The Qurʾān uses this manner in other places as well — as in speaking of the angels and then naming Gabriel (Jibrīl) separately.
The function here is this: a general expression can equally relieve a person and paralyse him. The sentence "I take refuge from the evil of everything" is true but abstract; it points to nothing. After it the sūra counts three concrete evils and so makes the abstract fear recognisable. A fear that has no name cannot be managed.
And the choice of the three instances is not random. We shall take this up as a whole after the fifth verse.