وَٱلَّذِينَ يُظَٰهِرُونَ مِن نِّسَآئِهِمْ ثُمَّ يَعُودُونَ لِمَا قَالُوا۟ فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مِّن قَبْلِ أَن يَتَمَآسَّا ذَٰلِكُمْ تُوعَظُونَ بِهِۦ وَٱللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ
Wa'lladhīna yuẓāhirūna min nisāʾihim thumma yaʿūdūna limā qālū fa-taḥrīru raqabatin min qabli an yatamāssā, dhālikum tūʿaẓūna bihi, wa'llāhu bimā taʿmalūna khabīr
"Those who make ẓihār against their wives and then go back on what they said must set free a neck before the two of them touch one another. You are being admonished by this. God is aware of what you do."
This expression is the most disputed place in the sūra, and the schools of law part company here. What does "going back on what they said" mean?
Even rendering it into English forces a choice, because the pattern ʿāda li- can be pulled in two directions at once: "he returned to what he said" (he repeated the formula) or "he went back on what he said" (he retracted it).
| View | What it understands | Its consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Ḥanafī | To count again as lawful what he had made unlawful to himself by the ẓihār formula, that is, to turn towards continuing relations with his wife | The expiation becomes due with the will to return to the relationship |
| Shāfiʿī | Not to divorce the woman after the ẓihār but to keep her in his marriage for a time | The expiation becomes due by not divorcing |
| Mālikī | To resolve, to intend, to be with his wife | The expiation becomes due with the resolve |
| Ẓāhirī tendency | To repeat the formula itself | The expiation is due only if the formula is repeated |
Here I adopt no preference and I issue no legal ruling; per the method (Method) the views of the schools are conveyed, not decided between. But to show why the disagreement arose is the business of exegesis:
The source of the disagreement is a single letter: لِ (lām). Had it said ʿāda ilā, it would have been "he returned to it" and the debate would largely have ended. Had it said ʿāda ʿan, it would have been "he turned back from it". The lām stands between the two, and in Arabic it can convey both direction towards and implication.
And an observation: the practical result of the disagreement comes out at the same place on the first three views — if the marriage is to be continued, the expiation is required. The differences concern at which moment the expiation becomes obligatory. That is, the disagreement is not over the existence of the ruling but over its timing.
A verbal link within the sūra. This pattern — yaʿūdūna limā — comes once more in the eighth verse: "Then they return to what they were forbidden" (ثُمَّ يَعُودُونَ لِمَا نُهُوا۟ عَنْهُ). The same verb, the same letter, the same relative pronoun.
In both places there is a "returning", but one is closed with an expiation and the other with Hell. Where is the difference? The return in the third verse is a turning back from a wrong word; the one in the eighth is a going back to a forbidden behaviour. The same verb, two opposite directions. By using the same pattern twice, the sūra shows that returning is in itself neither good nor bad, and that the direction is what decides.
The same root has an interesting branch: taḥrīr is also used in Arabic in the sense of "writing" (setting a text down in the pen). The lexicographers dwell on how the two senses join; the common core may be "to purify a thing, to bring it to a pure state, to set it right". I do not speak with certainty.
There is one more use of the same root in the Qurʾān: when the wife of ʿImrān dedicates her child, "I have vowed to You what is in my womb, set free" — مُحَرَّرًا (Āl ʿImrān 3/35). There too there is a "loosing from everything else": the child is freed from worldly services and dedicated to the temple.
رَقَبَة — Root: ر-ق-ب. The neck. From the same root raqīb (the one who watches — who cranes his neck to look), murāqaba (surveillance).
The verse does not say "to set a slave free". It says "to set a neck free". This is a metaphor (naming the part and meaning the whole), and not an accidental metaphor: the captive and the slave are bound by the neck. The word carries within it the physical image of bondage.
The verb fakk (to loose, to open a bond) in Sūrat al-Balad brings out plainly the image of the bond in the word. The neck is bound; the work to be done is to open the bond.
And now look at the logic of the regulation. A man put a woman into suspense with a sentence. What is his penalty? To loose someone else's bond.
This is an unusual form of penalty. The penalty is not the infliction of a pain measured against the offence; it is a compelling to do a good of the same kind as the offence. The one who locks shall open. The one who binds shall loose. The structure of the offence determines the structure of the expiation.
This symmetry is not much emphasised in the sources; I record it as a reading, but it stands in the text: on both sides what is at issue is a human being's inability to move.
يَتَمَآسَّا — Root: م-س-س. To touch. Form VI (tafāʿul) and the dual: before the two touch one another mutually.
First, the dual. The verb is dual: yatamāssā — "the two of them". That is, the condition of the expiation is not attached to the man alone; both sides of the relationship are named together. It is the man who makes the ẓihār; but the sentence that carries the condition makes the two of them subject together.
Second, the Form VI pattern. It conveys reciprocity. This takes the word out of being a one-sided act.
The function of the timing condition. The note "before" closes off the possibility of postponing the expiation. The expiation is not a debt to be paid later; it is the threshold before the door. If the man wants to return to his marriage, he will pay the price first.
The practical consequence of this carries the whole effect of the regulation: the word ceases to be something easily said. Saying it has a price, and the price is paid in advance.
The verse does not call the expiation a "punishment" (ʿuqūba). It calls it "admonition". That is, the purpose of the obligation is not to inflict pain but to remind.
تُوعَظُونَ — passive: "you are being admonished". Who does the admonishing is not said — but it is clear from the context. The passive brings forward not the source of the admonition but its addressee.
And note: ذَٰلِكُمْ carries the plural pronoun of address — "you all". The verse speaks not to the man who made the ẓihār but to the whole community. That is, the expiation is positioned not as one person's private matter but as a practice that everyone sees and takes a lesson from.
خَبِير (Khabīr) — Root: خ-ب-ر. The concrete sense of this root is worth dwelling on: khabr/khibr carries the sense of ploughing the soil, turning what is underneath to the top; al-khabīr is the farmer. From here khabar: to know the inside of a thing, to be aware of its inner face.
That is, Khabīr is not one who knows from the outside but one who knows the inside. And it fits this verse exactly: because whether the expiation is required depends on the man's inner intention — "going back on what he said" is not a visible act but a turning. The verse closes with the name of the one who knows this inner turning.
The choice of verse-ending thus ceases to be an accident: if the ruling has been tied to an inner intention, the name to be mentioned at the end of the ruling will be the one who knows the inside.