وَإِن كَذَّبُوكَ فَقُل لِّى عَمَلِى وَلَكُمْ عَمَلُكُمْ … أَفَأَنتَ تُسْمِعُ ٱلصُّمَّ … أَفَأَنتَ تَهْدِى ٱلْعُمْىَ · إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ ٱلنَّاسَ شَيْـًٔا وَلَٰكِنَّ ٱلنَّاسَ أَنفُسَهُمْ يَظْلِمُونَ
"If they deny you, say: 'My work is mine and your work is yours. You are quit of what I do, and I am quit of what you do.' · There are those among them who listen to you. But can you make the deaf hear — when they do not use their reason? · There are those among them who look at you. But can you guide the blind — when they do not see? · God does no wrong to people in any way; but people wrong themselves."
A sentence of parting. It occurred in many places in the index (al-Kāfirūn, al-Zumar 39/15 and 39/39 in iʿmalū … innī ʿāmil, al-Qaṣaṣ 28/55). I rely on that treatment.
What belongs here is the second half of the sentence: antum barīʾūna mimmā aʿmalu wa ana barīʾun mimmā taʿmalūn.
The root ب-ر-أ: to be free of a thing, to be separated from it, to keep clear of it. Barāʾa — having no connection.
And the symmetry must be recorded: the sentence is built with the same word in both directions. The parting, that is, is not a one-sided rejection but a mutual statement of a boundary.
| Verse | Who is there | The question | The pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| 42 | Man yastamiʿūna ilayk — those who listen | A-fa-anta tusmiʿu'ṣ-ṣumm | Listening ≠ hearing |
| 43 | Man yanẓuru ilayk — those who look | A-fa-anta tahdi'l-ʿumy | Looking ≠ seeing |
And in both verses the pronoun is brought forward: a-fa-anta. In Arabic this fronting states specification: "is it you?" — that is, this is not your work.
I record this as my own reading, and its ground is this fronting: neither verse says that the act is impossible; both say that the agent is being sought in the wrong place. And indeed in the ninety-ninth verse the same pattern will come once more: a-fa-anta tukrihu'n-nās.
And the difference between the two verses must be recorded: the listening and the looking do happen (yastamiʿūna, yanẓuru). What is missing is the result. The problem, that is, is not failure to arrive but failure to meet a response where it arrives. The measure recorded at al-Baqara 2/74 works here: "the question is not whether the knowledge arrives but whether the place it arrives at takes it in."
وَلَوْ كَانُوا۟ لَا يَعْقِلُونَ / وَلَوْ كَانُوا۟ لَا يُبْصِرُونَ — and the note at the end of the two verses differs, and this is worth recording.
| Verse | Sense | What is added |
|---|---|---|
| 42 | Deafness — hearing | Lā yaʿqilūn — not using reason |
| 43 | Blindness — sight | Lā yubṣirūn — not seeing |
I record this as an observation about the word order: what is added to deafness is reason, what is added to blindness is sight again. The loss of hearing, that is, might have been made up for by reason; the verse closes that door too. I give this explanation in the direction the lexicographers record it, not as a settled ruling.
إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ ٱلنَّاسَ شَيْـًٔا (44) — and the sentence joins with the ruling of the twenty-third verse: innamā baghyukum ʿalā anfusikum. The two verses point in the same direction: the outcome comes back upon the one who acts.
At Fuṣṣilat 41/46 (wa mā rabbuka bi-ẓallāmin li'l-ʿabīd) the same principle was treated; I rely on that treatment.