al-Najm 53:31

Wa li'llāhi mā fi'l-samāwāti wa mā fi'l-arḍ · Li-yajziya'lladhīna asāʾū bimā ʿamilū wa yajziya'lladhīna aḥsanū bi'l-ḥusnā "To God belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth — that He may requite those who did evil for what they did, and requite with the best those who did good."

The particle لِ (li-yajziya) is here for causation (taʿlīl): "in order to…".

And at first sight this is a strange link. "To God belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth" — and the reason for this is to give requital?

The link is this, and here lies the logic of the verse: the authority to requite arises from ownership. If you are not the owner of a thing you can pass no ruling over it. The right to call to account comes from ownership.

And this is a law that society knew very well: a master calls his slave to account, an owner keeps the reckoning of his flock, a proprietor makes the division of his property.

The verse carries this known principle to the scale of the universe. At verse twenty-five it had been said: "to God belong the last and the first." Verse thirty-one repeats the same ownership by way of place, and this time adds its consequence.

The two verses together make a whole: time and place. I record this as an observation.

The two clauses are built with the same verb but their ends differ:

The symmetry has been deliberately broken.

Had it been symmetrical: for those who did evil bimā ʿamilū, and for those who did good bimā ʿamilū as well. Or: for those who did evil bi'l-sūʾā, for those who did good bi'l-ḥusnā.

The verse takes a third path:

• The one who did evil is met with exactly what he did. No more. Bimā ʿamilū — "with what they wrought."
• The one who did good is met with "the best". Bi'l-ḥusnā — the feminine of the elative: "with what is more beautiful."

Punishment, that is, is exact measure; the reward is more.

This principle is made an explicit rule in the Qurʾān:

"Whoever comes with a good deed shall have ten like it. And whoever comes with an evil deed shall be requited only with its like, and they shall not be wronged." (al-Anʿām 6/160)

"The recompense of an evil is an evil like it." (al-Shūrā 42/40)

Both verses set up the same asymmetry: equivalence in evil, excess in good.

And verse thirty-one has lodged this inside the grammar. The choice of word changes: in the one a verb (ʿamilū — what they did), in the other an adjective (al-ḥusnā — what is most beautiful). The first party is attached to its own act; the second party passes beyond its act.

I record this as an observation; that the two clauses are built differently is data of the text and can be compared.

س-و-أ. Sūʾ — evil, ugliness. أَسَاءَ (Form IV) — he did evil. From the same root sayyiʾa (an evil deed), sawʾa (what must be covered).

ح-س-ن. Ḥusn — beauty, goodness. أَحْسَنَ (Form IV) — he did beautifully, he did good. From the same root iḥsān, ḥasana, ḥusnā.

Both are in Form IV, and this is a nicety of word order. In Arabic this form conveys transitivity and the bringing forth of something. The verbs mean, therefore, not "they became evil / they became good" but "they produced evil / they produced good."

The difference matters: the verse is not describing a character, it is recording a production. Not a bad person / a good person; one who does evil / one who does good.