al-Qalam 68:42-43

Yawma yukshafu ʿan sāqin wa yudʿawna ilā'l-sujūdi fa-lā yastaṭīʿūn — khāshiʿatan abṣāruhum tarhaquhum dhillah, wa qad kānū yudʿawna ilā'l-sujūdi wa hum sālimūn "On the day when the matter is laid bare and they are called to prostrate but cannot; their eyes cast down, humiliation covering them. Yet they used to be called to prostrate while they were sound and whole."

The most disputed verse in the sūra. And it touches on one of the most delicate subjects in the history of theology.

First it is necessary to establish exactly what the text says, because the debate is often conducted over something the text does not say.

The literal data of the verse:

1. The verb is passive: yukshafu — "it is uncovered", "it is laid bare". No agent is stated. 2. The noun is indefinite: sāqin — "a shin". There is no definite article. 3. There is no construct: it does not say sāqihī ("His shin"). There is no annexation.

These three data stand in the text and this is the ground of the debate. The verse does not say, literally, that a shin is ascribed to God.

And the word has an established idiomatic use in Arabic:

كَشَفَ عَن سَاقٍ / قَامَتِ ٱلْحَرْبُ عَلَى سَاقٍ — "the matter has turned serious", "the situation has grown hot", "the joking is over."

The origin of the idiom, as the lexicographers transmit it, is this: among the old Arabs, when a man set about a serious task, when he prepared to flee or to fight, the skirt of his garment was gathered up and the shin was bared. A long garment hinders running; tucking it up is the sign of setting to work.

So the idiom is born not from a body part but from a movement of preparation. The English expression "to roll up one's sleeves" carries almost exactly the same picture — and no English speaker understands it as a statement about anyone's arms.

This is a linguistic datum and needs recording. But it does not by itself end the debate, because the question is how a scriptural text is to be handled.

In this commentary I take no side. I transmit both stances as they are:

Both stances agree on the principle that God does not resemble created things. Where they part is over how the wording is to be handled — this is a difference of method, not a difference of creed.

One further note is needed: various reports are transmitted about this verse in the exegetical and hadith literature. I do not transmit these reports, because I cannot vouch for their soundness or their wording. The rule written into the method operates here directly: I do not ascribe to a source a saying of which I am not certain.

And this I must say plainly: to state no definite preference on this matter is not an evasion but a choice of method. Taking sides in theological disputes is not the business of this commentary; transmitting the disagreement accurately and honestly is.

Theological dispute aside, the function of the verse in its context is beyond dispute, and it is this that needs recording.

The verse sets a scene: they are called to prostrate and they cannot prostrate.

And this is where the whole argument of the sūra arrives.

سَجَدَ — root س-ج-د. To bow, to fall to the ground. And in the concrete sense of the root lies the touching of the forehead to the ground.

فَلَا يَسْتَطِيعُونَ — "they cannot". Root ṭ-w-ʿ; the same root as the tuṭiʿ of the eighth verse: to comply willingly.

And now a link within the sūra, as my own reading:

The same root, in two places, in two opposite conditions. In the one there is the possibility of complying and it is forbidden; in the other there is the wish to comply and no possibility.

I record this contrast as a datum of the text; the link I make is interpretation.

And the idea the verse produces is this: a capacity, unused, is lost.

This runs along the same line as the principle treated in the discussion of al-Layl. The finding there was: "a behaviour grows easier the more it is repeated… The verse positions this melting away as a punishment."

Al-Qalam 68/42-43 shows the same principle from the other side: what is not done becomes, in the end, impossible to do.

خَشَعَ — root خ-ش-ع. This root was treated at length in the discussion of al-Ghāshiya (88/2); I do not repeat it here. In summary of the finding there: "khushūʿ is a lowering visible from outside: the voice dropping, the neck bending, the eye falling."

And the principal finding of the discussion of al-Ghāshiya operates here exactly:

"The difference lies in whether it is voluntary or not. The khushūʿ of prayer is a lowering that is chosen. The khushūʿ of that day is compulsory. The person is not lowering himself; he finds himself lowered."

Al-Qalam 68/42-43 is the plainest statement of that finding: the person is called to prostrate (choice), but cannot do it (compulsion). And his eyes fall (compulsory khushūʿ).

So the principle recorded in al-Ghāshiya — "there is no option of not bowing; only when to bow can be chosen" — has here turned into a scene.

رَهِقَ — root ر-ه-ق. To come over a thing and cover it, to overtake and envelop it. Rahaq — an oppression that covers, excess.

And the direction of the verb is worth noting: the humiliation finds them; they do not go to the humiliation. Tarhaquhum — humiliation envelops them.

ذِلَّة — root ذ-ل-ل. Treated in the discussion of al-Mulk 67/15: the root has two neighbouring senses — dhull (abasement) and dhill (docility).

And now a link is made between the two sūras, as my own reading:

The same root, a favour in the one and a punishment in the other. The root's two branches of meaning (docility and lowliness) carry this difference.

And the heaviest sentence in the verse is this.

"Yet they used to be called to prostrate while they were sound and whole."

سَالِم — root س-ل-م. The same root as the muslim of the thirty-fifth verse; treated there: soundness, freedom from defect, completeness.

And this is one of the sūra's tightest internal links, as my own reading:

The same root: one has handed over his soundness, the other has trusted in his soundness.

And the principle the sentence produces is this: the call was made while the person's strength was intact. That is, the choice was placed before them at a time when a choice could be made.

This is a note that looks to the sūra as a whole: the men in the narrative had been warned too (verse 28: "did I not say to you?"). The verses were recited to the man in the portrait too (verse 15). The warning was always there.

And the picture recorded in the discussion of al-Mulk echoes here: there those in the Fire are asked "did no warner come to you?" and the answer "yes, one came" is received. The two sūras say the same thing: the problem is not a lack of information.

The most practical idea the verse produces is the passage from "cannot" to "does not".

A person's not doing something is mostly a choice. But as the choice is repeated, it ceases to be a choice.

This is observable in daily life: a skill long unused is lost; a relationship long unmade becomes impossible to make; a word long unsaid becomes unsayable.

The verse carries this mechanism into the hereafter: the person who does not bow by choice in this world cannot bow on that day.

And the note sālimūn fixes where the responsibility lies: the call was made while the person was strong. That his strength went afterwards does not mean the call did not reach him.

A boundary: I do not draw from this verse a general ruling of the kind "a late repentance is never accepted". The verse describes the day of reckoning; the Qurʾān has other statements about the door of repentance in this world, and they must be taken up in their own places.